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“Der Drang nach Ganzheit.” Striving for the whole. This
phrase was the key slogan of the second Leipzig school of
psychology,Ganzheitspsychologie. The phrase aptly captures
the existential dimensions of human experience: we all exist
in time and as such must grabble with the uncertainty of the
past, the incompleteness of the present, and the indetermi-
nacy of the future. Every moment of our lives involves
struggles to overcome these ambiguities and become secure
wholes. Though we may make great gains stabilizing the
world and ourselves over our life, this process will never be
complete. We will forever live in a world of becoming. This
situation affords on the one hand, anxiety and ambivalence,
and on the other, creativity and novelty.
Despite the centrality of these dynamics to human life,
contemporary psychology has contributed little to their
investigation (with some notable exceptions—e.g., Ernst
Boesch, discussed by Simão in chapter 8 of Striving for the
Whole). This is a result of contemporary psychology’s
anxiety about phenomena that cannot be easily studied
through its elementary parts (i.e., variables). One might
even call this tendency of the discipline “intolerance to
ambiguity” (Adorno et al. 1950)—the ambiguity here being
that the properties of wholes cannot be understood from
their parts alone. For broader insight into holistic dynamics
it is beneficial to go back to an earlier era of psychology
that focused on the mind as a complex and developing
whole.
Diriwächter and Valsiner’s Striving for the whole
provides an excellent selected survey of early twentieth
century theories of holism, centered around Ganzheitspsy-
chologie, together with a few historical precursors and
contemporary developments. The editors’ expressed aim is
to bring back a strong philosophical and theoretical
framework into contemporary psychology so as to strive
toward a “unity” in our understanding of mind—in other
words, to see the whole (bigger picture) behind the mass of
“data-driven” research. The present review will attempt to
further the goals of this book by highlighting and
developing some key ideas discovered in it. First, I
contextualize and contrast Ganzheitspsychologie with other
contemporaneous holistic theories; second, I explore how the
whole was lost in psychology; and third, I focus on some
methodological principles of holism and how they might be
applied to reinvigorate a holistic psychology today.
Varieties of Holism
In 1917, after Wilhelm Wundt’s retirement, Felix Krueger
took over the Leipzig institute. Wundt had focused his
experimental efforts on the study of how elementary
sensations combined into a whole in experience. He
reserved the study of wholes transforming into other wholes
for his Völkerpsychologie, his “higher”1 psychology, which
dealt with issues such as language, custom, religion, and
myth. For example, in his Elemente der Völkerpsychologie
1 It was “higher” both because it dealt with higher psychological
processes—cultural processes, as opposed to sensory and motor
processes—and because it was more valued (Kusch 1999).
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(translated as Elements of Folk Psychology) he traced
various developmental stages of societies—e.g., (a) the
primitive man, (b) the totemic era, (c) the ages of heroes
and gods, (d) the development of humanity—as evidenced
in their products of thought (Diriwächter 2004). The second
Leipzig school, lead by Krueger, rebelled against the
emphasis of Wundt’s experimental approach, arguing that
experiences in everyday life were not decomposed into
elements. Outside of the laboratory, experience did not
show a movement from PARTS to WHOLE but from one
WHOLE to another WHOLE (which Wundt had applied to
his study of societies, not experiments on individuals’
experience). It was the dynamics of the latter holistic
transformation (wholes “becoming” other wholes) that the
Krueger and colleagues focused on in their investigations,
experimental and otherwise (see Diriwächter, chapter 3).
Today psychologists are unlikely to remember the
sophisticated efforts of Ganzheitspsychologie. Most now
think of Gestalt psychology when they hear the word
“holism”. Despite the interest of both schools of thought in
“wholes,” they emphasized different aspects: Gestalt psy-
chology took its inspiration primarily from physics and thus
concentrated on “objectivity” in perception. By contrast, for
Ganzheitspsychologie aesthetics was the basis of their
psychology; thus, they highlighted the role of feeling as
diffuse wholes, wholes without clear boundaries. Feelings
were thought to operate at the core of our experience, rather
than being merely a secondary quality (see Diriwächter,
chapter 3; Görlitz, chapter 5). Furthermore, Gestalt psy-
chology focused on stable and sometimes dynamic wholes
but not wholes in a state of tension, anticipation and
becoming, as did Ganzheitspsychologie. Let us consider
some concrete examples of visual wholes investigated in
each approach to illustrate these differences.
In Fig. 1, Kanizsa’s triangle, on the far left, illustrates the
Gestalt law of “closure,” whereby the parts are grouped
together to complete some entity. The triangle that appears
in the middle of the configuration does not change. It is
there immediately at the start and continues to be present
throughout. By contrast, the images in the middle (i.e. the
Rubin’s figure) and on the far right are dynamic, but not
developing. There is an intermediate point of ambiguity
(e.g., the border between the face and vase) but the border
itself can only change into a face or a vase. In switching
between the two possible wholes we foreground one and
background the other. Nothing new emerges from the
image once we have seen both figures.
Inkblots are an example of more diffuse visual wholes
that are open to multiple interpretations (see Fig. 2, below).
From early in psychology’s short history inkblots have been
recognized as an apt tool for studying imagination (see
Binet and Henri 1896). However, in using inkblots we do
not necessarily access the intermediate processes by which
subjects construct a stable imaginary form; we simply hear
about the end result. Bartlett (1916) partially captures the
movement from one whole to another by using a series of
inkblots and reading between participants’ interpretations.
He reports persistence of a topic and attitude in partic-
ipants’ interpretations of the series of inkblots—for exam<
ple, one participant sees “ghosts”; “more ghosts kissing”;
“more kissing”; “green ghosts” (Bartlett 1916, p. 255).2 But
this does not capture wholes still in a state of tension and
becoming; rather it accesses the movement between one
relatively stable whole to the next, demonstrating the
relative stability of our interpretive stance. Another means
of accessing the perception as an unfolding process will
have to be found.
The Insight of Ganzeit
The method innovated by Ganzheitspsychologie for study-
ing wholes in tension and development was called
Aktualgenese. The experimenter “slowed down” the process
of perception by first presenting stimuli in sub-optimal
conditions—for example, at the periphery of one’s visual
field, at a distance, for a fraction of a second or extremely
small. The stimulus conditions were then gradually im-
proved step-by-step, while participants’ constructive over-
coming of ambiguity was recorded at each juncture.
Figure 3 (below) illustrates one early experiment by
Wohlfahrt (1932) using this technique. The target stimulus
was first presented in miniature. The size was then
2 Bartlett frequently and emphatically uses the phrase “an effort after
meaning” to describe his various experimental results, in both this
publication and others that follow. This phrase comes very close to
Ganzheitspsychologie’s “striving for the whole”, though I have not
found evidence of direct influence between the two groups. Instead,
the notion must have been part of the early 20th century European
Zeitgeist.
Fig. 1 Stable (left) and dynamic
(middle and left) wholes. Neither
is developing
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increased in increments of 25%. Participants drew what
they saw at each step in the movement from diffuse to
articulate, thus creating a series of drawings.
The series can be analyzed in two interrelated ways.
First, we can analyze the participant’s successive actualiza-
tion of different Gestalt factors. In the beginning (stage a
and b), participants only see a bright circular patch. The
participant differentiates the figure into inner field and outer
field. But the inner field remains active and amorphous
until stage c when a line appears. Finally, in stage f the
figure is no longer “closed” (to use Gestalt psychology’s
term), but instead becomes “multiple” as the participant
experiences a moment of insight. Throughout the stages
there is a tendency towards “regular” over “irregular”
forms.
Second, the series can be read as a participant’s creative
striving at each stage to go beyond the information given
and construct a unitary form. When I have tried out this
experiment myself I have found participants giving the
figure an iconic cultural form: in early stages of the series,
the figure was labeled and drawn as a “house”, “musical
note”, “pac man”, “sailboat”, etc. The percept that they
constructed was a culturally meaningful whole, which was
already anticipating the next stimulus exposure. This
forward-looking character to perception was surprisingly
unattended to by Gestalt psychology (Rosenthal 2004).
The motor of these constructive processes is tension.
Tension is produced in a situation where there are forces
simultaneously pushing and pulling in different directions—
in the psychological domain, they are opposing tendencies of
action and change. Marková (2003) points out that “tension”
is used widely in both the discourses of science and
everyday life: Compare, for example, the words “at-tention”,
“in-tension”, “re-tention”, “dis-tention”, “con-tension”, “de-
tention”, etc. Tension’s highly polysemic nature highlights
the need for such a concept. Psychology needs the concept
of tension to understand “development”, not in the sense of
“child psychology”, but in its earlier meaning of a directed,
dynamic and holistic process of change. It is only in a
system where there is tension that true development can
occur. This idea is also explored in Janet’s theory of
emotions (see Zittoun, chapter 7), Vygotsky’s famous law
of cultural development,3 narrative psychology,4 dialogical
psychology (e.g., Marková 2003), among other approaches.
The Strange History of Losing the Whole
Ganzheitspsychologie was one of the dominant approaches in
Germany before, during and, to a lesser extent, proceeding
WWII (see Görlitz, chapter 5, for an account in Heidelberg). It
even spread around the world to newly developing psychol-
ogy in places as far as Japan (see Takasuna and Sato, chapter
4). By the late 1950s, however, Ganzheitspsychologie was
largely abandoned. The approach was criticized by some
(e.g., Vygotsky) for inadequately theorizing higher mental
process, but the main reasons for its abandonment (along
with other holistic approaches) were largely unscientific in
nature: the language of Ganzheitspsychologie, for example,
coincided with the Nazi movement’s rhetoric and ideology
(Valsiner and Diriwächter, book conclusion; Mandler 2007,
chapter 8). As a result of this association, the holistic
terminology of Ganzheitspsychologie took on stigma after
the war and as such was difficult to use independently of
politics.
At a more general level, WWII also had the effect of
dislocating the highly holistic German-Austrian tradition of
psychology, which at the time was the new discipline’s
3 Vygotsky (1987) famously said, “[E]very function in the cultural
development of the child appears on the stage twice, in two planes,
first, the social, then the psychological, first between people as an
intermental category, then within the child as an intramental category.
This pertains equally to voluntary attention, to logical memory, to the
formation of concepts, and to the development of will” (p. 145).
Veresov (2010) has pointed out that the word “category” came from
Russian theater criticism and Hegel, where it meant a kind of
“dramatic collision”, or in other words “tension” occurring on stage.
4 Narratology teaches us that narratives are only generated when there
is “tension” (or “trouble”) between act, scene, agent, agency and
purpose (Burke 1945); when things are going as anticipated there are
“scripts”, such as going what is involved going to a restaurant (Shank
and Abelson 1977), but not “narratives”.
Fig. 2 Inkblots are examples of
diffuse wholes
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world leader (Toomela 2007). Many important psycholo-
gists lost their positions under the Nazis and/or immigrated
(e.g., Felix Krueger was found to be 1/4 Jewish, and as
such was not given the prestigious Goethe Prize and even
worse, had to emigrate to Switzerland, where he died in
1948). Some were able to secure positions in the US and
developed active research programs there (e.g., Lewin,
Koffka, Köhler, Wertheimer, Werner) but they had to adapt
themselves to the local context and their US students
developed research in a very different vein (Ash 2002).5
Others, such as Karl Bühler, Wilhelm Stern and Karl
Duncker, never adjusted to the change. Finally, those that
remained in Germany were highly constrained in the
research they could conduct—race research was the topic
promoted by the Nazis.6 The history of holism provides an
illuminating example of how scientific theories and
practices are embedded in culture; when relocated they
become assimilated to the receiving culture.7
But perhaps the most central reason for the demise of
holism in psychology was the methodological shift away
from a focus on wholes to correlations between variables,
in the first half of the 20th century. This was done for the
purposes of large-scale prediction and control of behavior,
rather than the advancement of basic scientific knowledge
(Danziger 1990). Knowledge of how a variable had effects
at the level of a population was seen as “socially relevant”
(i.e., useful) by emerging social institutions, such as
education and the army. Thus, psychologists using an
aggregate methodology appealed to the general public and
social institutions, rather than expert scientists, to legitimize
their knowledge. Interestingly, the aggregate investigative
model was first developed by Francis Galton (Darwin’s
half-cousin) in the late 19th century in the hopes that his
research would eventually contribute to an English eugen-
ics program. His inspiration came from his use of aggregate
methods to predict the weather from countless low/high
reports on different locations of a map.
What is lost in aggregate research—now psychology’s
(unquestioned) standard methodology—is a conceptualiza-
tion of individuals as more than the sum of their parts.
Statisticians, at the time, were careful to point out that inter-
individual variation (i.e., at the level of a population) is not
isomorphic with intra-individual variation (i.e., at the level
of an individual) (see also similar contemporary arguments
by Molenaar 2004). Thus, it is not legitimate to make
claims about individual functioning from this methodolog-
5 An excellent example of this is the fate of Lewin et al. (1939) classic
study conducted in the USA. They created ‘authoritarian’, ‘democratic’
and ‘laissez-faire’ groups whose differences could then be holistically
compared. Lewin thought these different ‘group climates’ could not be
reduced to elementary variables. Already by the early 1950s, Lewin’s
holistic form of experimentation was incomprehensible to leading
American psychologists, even those sympathetic to Gestalt ideas. For
example, Festinger (1953, p. 138) criticized it in these terms: “rather
than isolating and precisely manipulating a single variable or small set
of variables, the experimenters attempted a large and complex
manipulation. There was also little attempt at control.” A methodology
that did not reduce to cause and effect relationships between variables
was demeaned unscientific (see Danziger 1990; 1992; 2000). An
exception to this American tendency was the work of Lewin’s student
Asch. Though Asch’s (1952) conformity studies remain classics the
holistic aspects of his analysis are rarely discussed.
6 Wolfgang Metzger of the Gestalt school did remain active in
Germany during the war by opportunistically reformulating the
holistic approach to support Nazi ideology. He recanted post-war
and continued to pursue Gestalt ideas.
7 Bartlett’s (1932) serial reproduction experiments aptly capture the
psychological dimensions of this process. They are also illuminating
examples of a holistic experimental methodology.
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
Fig. 3 An actual-genetic series
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ical approach. Yet, that error is entirely commonplace in
contemporary research practice, particularly in experimen-
tal psychology. It is, of course, unfair to say that a holistic
orientation has been completely abandoned by psychology;
rather I want to claim that its status as a guide for
methodology has been marginalized.8 In the next section I
will outline some principles of methodological holism,
which contrast strongly with the contemporary study of
variables. In the section that follows this, I will look at
some recent applications of a holistic approach to research.
The Principle of Hierarchical Organization
The whole is more than the sum of its parts. This notion is an
important first principle of holism, but on its own it does not
yet say much. Perceptual forms, as explored above, are
holistic but they occur within the larger whole of an
individual’s life. The individual is a whole with properties
that cannot be deduced from its parts alone, but the social
group—made up of individual persons—has properties
irreducible to the individuals within it.9 Intergroup dynamics
explores still larger wholes. And we could go on. In short,
whole and part are relative terms, which change according to
the context in which they are applied. Without including
some principle of hierarchical organization (i.e. wholes
embedded in larger wholes) reality becomes one fluid whole,
and thus impossible to investigate. Valsiner (2009) notes that
this principle is often overlooked within sociocultural
psychology, resulting in theoretical difficulties.
By contrast, biologists have long recognized that
organisms are complex hierarchically organized systems,
in which higher processes regulate a lower processes (see
Khatchikian, chapter 11)—gene expression, neural func-
tioning, and organ systems all provide examples of this.
Many holistic models of development in psychology have
explicitly used biological analogies. For example, Heinz
Werner, who formed his general orientation to psychology
in the Leipzig school, defined development as a process
“proceeding from a state of relative globality and lack of
differentiation to a state of increasing differentiation,
articulation, and hierachical integration” (Werner 1956,
p. 126). Werner was explicitly using embryonic develop-
ment as his metaphorical source: The embryo begins as an
undifferentiated mass of cells, which develops into different
cell types and eventually organ systems that become
hierarchically related.
Leibniz had already recognized the hierarchical embedd-
edness of different wholes in his Monadology (see
Ehrenstein, chapter 1), but it was von Ehrenfels (1890/
1988) classic paper “On gestalt qualities” that first brought
these dynamics to the forefront of psychology—the paper
had a major influence on both Gestalt psychology and
Ganzheitspsychologie (see Kissinger, chapter 2). Ehrenfels
is remembered for pointing out that the experience of a
melody (i.e., a “gestalt quality”) emerges from a series of
individual musical notes with a certain temporal structure.
Rearrange the same notes and the melody disappears. Or
play a totally different set of notes, with the same temporal
arrangement, at a higher pitch and the melody remains.
Hierarchical organization enters into this scheme when von
Ehrenfels (1890/1988) notes that gestalt qualities, such as
melodies, can become parts of higher gestalt qualities—for
example, many melodies make up a symphony.
Ehrenfelds goes even further in pointing out wholes
(on different levels) can have different degrees of
structure: An individual is a far more unified whole
than society.10 Society itself may be structured in
qualitatively different ways—for example, Durkheim
(1893), using technological and biological metaphors,
describes society’s movement from “mechnical” (undif-
ferentiated) to “organic” (differentiated) solidarity. In the
domain of psychology proper, feelings can be character-
ized as diffuse undifferentiated wholes that permeate
everything around us, whereas verbally describing an
experience constructs a highly structured whole. The
methodological challenge becomes not only one of
characterizing different wholes but also of analyzing the
relationships between them—in this case, between affec-
tive and linguistic mediation. I will offer some reflections
on advancing a developmental approach to hierarchical
organization in the next section.
10 Dialogical theorists have, however, recently attempted to show that
the self is much more divided and de-centered than has previously
been supposed (see Hermans 2002). Even that being so, it is still safe
to say society is more divided than the Self.
8 There are important counter examples to this. An anonymous
reviewer has aptly pointed out that the holistic orientation is still
strong in clinical neuroscience. V.S. Ramachandran, for example, has
consistently worked within the ‘romantic’ tradition of A.R. Luria,
which extends back to Vygotsky’s influence. Studies in clinical
neuroscience cannot achieve the large sample sizes required of
aggregate style research due to the rarity of cases. Perhaps this has
lead this field to tools for analyzing the complexity of whole single
cases.
9 Floyd Allport (1924, p. 4) is notorious for advocating an
individualistic social psychology: “There is no psychology of groups
that is not essentially and entirely a psychology of individuals. Social
psychology must not be placed in contradistinction to the psychology
of the individual; it is part of the psychology of the individual, whose
behavior it studies in relation to that sector of his environment
comprised by his fellows.” Before Allport the dominant conception of
the ‘social’ was the properties of groups, which could not be predicted
from a summation of individuals in the group, such as the customs,
values and norms specific to a particular group. The more ‘social’
social psychology was largely comparative in methods, exploring the
distinctive mentalities of different social groups (see Farr 1996;
Greenwood 2004).
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Development Between Direct Perception and
Construction
Above, we saw how Gestalt psychology attended to
‘objectivity’ in perception (e.g., how Kanizsa’s triangle is
immediately given), whereas Ganzheitspsychologie focused
on constructive developmental processes driven by affect
and tension. Gestalt psychology later became a major
source of inspiration for J.J. Gibson’s ecological approach
to perception, with its emphasis on ‘direct perception’ of
the environment, while Bruner and others developed a
constructive theory of perception, akin to Ganzheitspsycho-
logie. Debate over whether perception is better character-
ized as direct or constructed is unfruitful. Perception is both
direct and constructed. We directly perceive wholes in our
environment but can also reconstruct those wholes through
a process of mediation.
The world for us is not at its base an array of isolated
sensory impressions, but rather wholes embedded in
larger wholes. We experience roads, buildings, doorways,
cars, animals, other people as embedded wholes, not as
ensembles of sights, sounds, smells and touch. For
example, we tend not to experientially separate a
disgusting smell from the thing that smells; the thing
itself is what disgusts us. But through mediation we can
distance ourselves from the directly perceived world and
reconstruct its meaning. Consider this example of a
medieval nun’s use of mediation to overcome her
embodied reaction to an aversive smell:
The devil wanted to tempt Catherine of Siena’s
fortitude by upsetting her stomach, according to her
confessor, Raymond of Capua. When she was
removing the bandages from a sore of a penitent,
she was assailed by a stench so foul that “her inside
turned over and a great sensation of nausea convulsed
her stomach.” But this work of the devil failed
because she invoked the “bridegroom of her soul”
and drank a bowlful of the fetid stuff: “Never in my
life have I tasted any food and drink sweeter or more
exquisite.”
(Obeyesekere 2010, p. 129)
Catherine of Siena experiences nausea on encounter-
ing the fetid stuff under a patient’s bandage. But she is
able to reconstruct her initial reaction as the work of the
devil, and then by evoking Jesus Christ, the “bridegroom
of her soul”, she transforms the stuff into the sweet life
giving substance of Holy Communion, which opens up
the action potential of drinking it. This extreme example
points to processes of mediation we all use in our
everyday lives: For example, we immediately recognize
food that has fallen on the floor as “dirty” but can
overcome this meaning with the “five-second rule” (a
super-ordinate mediator which says that as long as the
food has been on the floor for less than five seconds it is
clean). In this case, society both sets a restriction on
eating the food, as well as provides a cultural means of
overcoming the restriction.
Vygotsky’s method of double stimulation allows
researchers to observe this process of mediation in action
(Gillespie and Zittoun 2010; Veresov 2010). The researcher
creates a situation where there is some block to action
(which in turn generates psychological tension) but also
guides participants towards the symbolic means of over-
coming the block. Thus, the situation stimulates a process
of meditation so that the researcher can observe its course.
Valsiner (2003) provides us with an illuminating recent
example of this technique: Participants were given a toy
gun and told they needed to decide whether to shoot or not
shoot a number of images that would be projected in front
of them. Images of a bull’s eye (shoot) and grandfather with
child (don’t shoot) required little or no meditational work—
in Gibson’s terms their meaning was directly perceived.
However, an image of Hitler generates an elaborate process
of mediation. Participants must reconcile two opposing
social suggestions, namely that Hitler is the embodiment of
evil and that one should not shoot human beings. These
opposing social suggests are agentically navigated by the
individual in deciding how to act. We see both the means
and processes used by participants to override their urge to
shoot. In contrast, at war soldiers are taught how to override
the opposite social suggestion. Once they hear “engage”
from their commander shooting becomes automatic—
consider the recent wikileak video showing soldiers lack
of meditational strategies leading to the killing of several
journalists and civilians.11
Conclusion: The Future of the Whole
In conclusion, Striving for the Whole provides readers with
many instructive examples of holistic thinking, particularly
in its developmental varieties. For those interested in
incorporating holistic insights into their research, it will
serve as a useful point of reflection. The book, however,
might itself have strove for further theoretical integration
and extension of holistic ideas into contemporary research
practice. The editors do extract some important principles
of holism for readers as well as point out weaknesses of the
current research practice that avoids holism; yet a decisive
way forward for holism in psychology remains to be
established. This is a major task perhaps well beyond the
11 See http://www.collateralmurder.com/ (wikileaks 2010)
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range of what can be expected from this largely historical
survey. It is up to readers to use these voices from the past
to develop a new form of psychology, which builds on the
insights of earlier holistic thinking. Like the stimuli sub-
optimally presented in Ganzheitspsychologie experiments,
this future psychology is still only an ambiguous figure on
the horizon, awaiting our creative efforts to actualize it.
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